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circumstances or products.
Whether one accepts or rejects the unreasonably dangerous
test in the Restatement's language, proof of a defect is a sine
qua non in products liability actions. Hopefully, the developing
case law will provide a more workable standard by which
defectiveness can be measured; until then, the Barker case
represents a positive attempt to eliminate negligence principles
from strict liability in tort.
-Bert Riddell Cramer
Residual Hearsay Excep-
tions & Confrontation:
Continuing Constitutional
Dilemma
by Thomas G. Ross
While there are numerous exceptions to the general rule that
hearsay evidence is inadmissible in formal court proceedings,
Rule 804 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for only
five categories of hearsay exceptions where the declarant is
unavailable.' The basic premise behind admitting such
evidence is the reliability factor surrounding the circum-
stances at the time a statement was made. These circum-
stances provide a substitute guarantee of reliability. Such
guarantee is necessary in order to admit testimony which may
be crucial to the outcome of the case.
Historically, the best safeguard against unreliable testimony
has been the right of opposing parties to cross-examine
adverse witnesses. The admission of hearsay evidence restricts
this ability in that it depends for its probative value upon the
testimony of someone not subject to cross-examination. For
this reason, the Rule 804 (b) exceptions are limited to cir-
cumstances that are theoretically so reliable as to overcome
the right in the opposing party to cross-examine the declarant.
The recent decision in United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131
(4th Cir. 1978), addresses itself to the admission of hearsay
testimony of an unavailable declarant and the defendants' right
of confrontation.
At trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, West and his two co-defendants were con-
victed of distribution of heroin and possession with intent to
distribute heroin, both violations of the Controlled Substance
Act, 21 U.S.C. §841 et seq.
2
1. 1) Former testimony, 2) Dying declaration; 3) Statement against Interest; 4)
Statement of personal or family history; 5) Other exceptions.
2. FACTS: The testimony of an unavailable declarant, Michael V. Brown, played
a critical role in the convictions of West and his co defendants. Brown had
volunteered to assist the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in its
investigation. At the time, he was incarcerated with a pending drug charge as well
as a parole violation detainer.
Under police surveillance, Brown purchased heroin from the defendants.
Several of his telephone calls to the defendants in which he set up a "buy" were
monitored, a transmitter was concealed on Brown to tape-record the conversa
tions; law enforcement officials observed and photographed Brown's meetings
with the defendants.
Before each transaction, Brown was searched for drugs and given money to
purchase heroin. According to the government's evidence, transactions took
place between Brown and West on three occasions, and three similar "deals"
were made between Brown and the two co-defendants.
The trial judge allowed the admission of the grand jury
testimony of Michael V. Brown, the unavailable declarant,
under Rule 804 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 He
noted that "under the circumstances, it [a transcript of
Brown's grand jury testimony] was essential and trustworthy."
574 F.2d at 1134.
The government's evidence at trial included photographs,
the transcript of Brown's grand jury testimony, testimony by an
expert in voice identification, and the purchased heroin. Also
offered as further corroboration of Brown's testimony were
tapes of Brown's conversations with the defendants and testi
mony of Drug Enforcement Administration agents regarding
their observations. Arrest records, as well as transcripts of
Brown's tape-recorded conversations with the defendants
were made available to defense coursed.
I. HEARSAY
Hearsay evidence is testimony, in court, or written
evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement
being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter. (emphasis added)
McCormick, Evidence, §246 at 584 (2d Edition, 1972).
Defendants contended that the trial court erred in admitting
the transcript of Brown's grand jury testimony. While it was not
contested that the transcript of that testimony met the neces-
sary criteria of clauses (A), (B) and (C) of Rule 804 (b) (5) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the defendants argued that the
provision had not been satisfied because the admitted state-
ments failed to have the requisite "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" as statements admitted under
any of the preceding four paragraphs of the rule (Rule 804 (b)
[1] [4]). Their contention was that the admission of Brown's
grand jury testimony was far less trustworthy than the other
Rule 804 (b) provisions required, and that the legislative history
of the rule provided that the provision was to be applicable only
After each transaction, DEA agents would search Brown and his car for
contraband. Brown would then return to the DEA office where he would meet
with a DEA agent to discuss and compose a summary of the events that took
place. They would also listen to the tape recordings.
On March 8, 1976, the defendants were indicted without Brown's testimony.
On March 16, 1976, however, Brown testified before a grand jury investigating
Virginia drug traffic.
In exchange for his cooperation, the government entered a nolle prosequi to
the pending drug charge against Brown and dismissed the detainer. He was given
$855 as a form of "protection" and released. On March 19, 1976, Brown was
murdered "contract-style," i.e. four bullets into the back of his head while he
was driving his car.
3. Rule 804 (b) (5) provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the fore-
going exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust
worthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the state
ment into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and
the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
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where "exceptional circumstances" attached to the statement
a degree of trustworthiness equiualent to the evidence admis-
sible under the other Rule 804 (b) exceptions. (emphasis
added). The defendants stressed the inherent lack of credi-
bility in Brown's statements due to his extensive criminal
record and their lack of an opportunity at any stage in the
case's development to cross-examine him about his
statements.
The case law of the federal circuits shows division over the
issue of the admission of prior grand jury testimony in the case
of an unavailable witness. In United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1971), a case decided prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules, Judge Friendly wrote for the unanimous three-
judge panel in ruling such testimony inadmissible:
Under such circumstances the admission of his grand jury
testimony would appear to offend not only the hearsay rule,
even in the liberalized form adopted by this circuit, but the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment as well,
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
443 F.2d at 115.
In two cases decided subsequent to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, two federal circuits have split in
their decisions concerning the admission of grand jury testi-
mony under Rule 804 (b) (5), the "Other Exceptions" provision.
The Eighth Circuit in United States u. Carlson, 547 F. 2d
1346 (1976), admitted the grand jury testimony of an unavail-
able witness as "evidence of a material fact" under this "trust-
worthiness" exception. In making a qualitative assessment of
the trustworthiness of the testimony, the court inquired into
both the reliability and the necessity of the witness' statements.
The court pointed to the fact that the "unavailable" witness,
while refusing to testify at trial, had stated at trial that his testi-
mony before the grand jury relating to his participation in a drug
transaction was true. In view of these facts, the court ruled that
the grand jury testimony was reliable and that, since no other
individual could testify about the drug transaction, there was a
substantial need to admit the grand jury transcript.
In United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (1977), the Fifth
Circuit was faced with the issue of whether grand jury testi-
mony of a co-conspirator who refused to testify at trial was
admissible under Rule 804(b)(5) as a statement with "equi-
valent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Under
Rule 804(a)(2), the co-conspirator was clearly "unavailable"
within its provisions due to his refusal to testify despite a grant
of immunity and a court order to so. That'court reviewed de-
terminations that were made at the trial court level regarding
"materiality, probative value, need for the evidence, and
interests of justice." Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5).
Due to the admission by the lower court of the grand jury
transcript of the unavailable witness, the Gonzalez court
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. Avoiding the
confrontation issue, the court held that such evidence was
unreliable hearsay which did not meet the "trustworthiness"
test due to the following factors:
1. Pressure of the prosecutor and grand jurors forcing an
answer from witness, whether true or not;
2. Answers of the witness were to leading questions not
permissible at trial;
3. The fact that the testimony was under oath, subject to
penalties for perjury, was insignificant due to threats made
by the prosecutor of repeated contempt sentences;
4. Witness had incentive not to tell the truth because of fear
of personal harm to himself and his family;
5. Testimony was unsupported and not subject to cross-
examination.
559 F.2d at 1273.
In distinguishing Carlson, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
unavailable witness there had refused to testify because of
threats directly attributable to the defendant. This was not the
case in Gonzalez.
In further concluding that Carlson was distinguishable, the
Gonzalez opinion noted the following factual distinctions
present in Carlson:
1. No indication of prosecutorial threat to the witness of
open-ended contempt sanctions for failure to testify;
2. No indication that the witness was as unwilling to testify
before the grand jury;
3. The witness specifically stated at the time of trial that his
testimony before the grand jury had been true, but that he
was afraid to testify further.
Chief Judge Haynsworth, in writing the 2-1 majority opinion
in West, affirmed the trial court ruling admitting the grand jury
testimony. 4 "There were present very exceptional circum
stances providing substantial guarantees of trustworthiness of
Brown's grand jury testimony probably exceeding by far the
substantial guarantees of trustworthiness of some of the other
§804 (b) hearsay exceptions." 574 F.2d at 1135. The majority
cited the following as "guarantees of trustworthiness":
1. "Elaborate steps" of DEA agents to assure that Brown
had no drugs or money (other than what the agents supplied
to him);
2. Brown was under DEA surveillance and photographs
were taken of him with one of the defendants;
3. A transmitter broadcast Brown's conversations with the
defendants, and the tape recorder preserved them;
4. Brown and DEA agent reviewed each transaction, and a
statement was prepared;
5. The DEA agents appeared as witnesses at trial and were
subject to cross-examination;
6. Defense counsel knew of Brown's criminal record and
his interest in avoiding further incarceration, both tools of
impeachment.
Under all these circumstances, the absence of an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine Brown is of considerably less signi-
ficance than in those cases involving statements against
interest, statements of family history, or dying declarations.
Whether the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
of Brown's grand jury testimony are equivalent to those
which arise from cross or d;rect examination which under-
lies the former testimony exception of §804 (b) (1), we need
not determine. In this unusual case, those guarantees were
probably greater, but the equivalent guarantees of trust-
worthiness requirement of §804 (b) (5) is met if there is
4. There were three other holdings in West, all affirming the trial court: ) Admis-
sion of grand jury testimony was not barred by the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment in view of substantial indicia of reliability, 2) Testimony of law
enforcement officials with respect to taped conversations was sufficient to au-
thenticate the tapes for admission purposes; 3) There was no abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court where the jury was allowed to see transcripts of taped
conversations while the tape was played.
equivalency of any one of the preceding §804 (b) excep-
tions. Clearly there is such equivalency with the exceptions
we find in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. (emphasis added)
574 F.2d at 1135, 1136.
In a one-paragraph dissent on this issue, Judge Widener
questioned the reliability of the admitted grand jury testimony.
Citing N.L.R.B v. McClure Associates, Inc., 556 F.2d 725 (4th
Cir. 1977), a case which held that an affidavit of one with no
interest in the proceeding was inadmissible because it did not
have the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness (§803 (24), identical in text to §804 (b) (5), was the basis for
that decision).
Accordingly, I do not agree that the guarantees of trust-
worthiness surrounding the grand jury testimony in this
case are any greater and should not be held sufficient to
allow its introduction into evidence under the residual
exception to the hearsay rule. Certainly the rule of exclu-
sion should be at least as broad in criminal as in civil
proceedings.
574 F.2d 1138, 1139.
11. CONFRONTATION
A closely-related principle, and one that seemingly contra-
dicts the residual hearsay exceptions, is contained in the Sixth
Amendment United States Constitutional mandate: "In all
criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."
As a secondary contention, the defendants asserted that
even if Brown's testimony met the §804 (b) (5) requirements,
the confrontation clause served as a bar to its admission. As
Chief Judge Haynsworth noted, the Supreme Court has held
that the right of confrontation requires the production not only
of all available witnesses but also the exclusion of unreliable
extra-judicial statements.
Citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), and California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), Chief Judge Haynsworth noted:
"Thus, we are required to make a separate determination,
focusing upon the Confrontation Clause itself, whether
Brown's grand jury testimony bore sufficient guarantees of
reliability, or whether the circumstances provided the jury with
sufficient bases to judge its trustworthiness." 574 F.2d at 1136.
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Since an 1892 Supreme Court opinion, Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140 (dying declarations), it has been held that
not all admissions in a criminal trial of extra-judicial statements
are barred by the confrontation clause. See also, California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (former testimony at preliminary
hearing); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (former
testimony at prior trial); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973) and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (declarations
against penal interest).
As the court states in its opinion, the Supreme Court has
held in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), that testimony at preliminary
hearing not subjected to cross-examination is barred by the
confrontation clause. Those cases indicated that the right of
confrontation is a basic trial right, requiring both the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh
in its fact-finding decision the demeanor of the witness.
The question that Chief Judge Haynsworth raised was
whether the right of confrontation requires an opportunity to
cross-examine in order to gain the reliability necessary to be
admitted at trial. (emphasis added). Acknowledging that the
Supreme Court has always distinguished, in cases involving
prior recorded testimony, between testimony that was subject
to cross-examination and testimony that was not, Chief Judge
Haynsworth, citing no Supreme Court cases, observed:
The Supreme Court has never intimated, however, that
cross-examination is the only means by which prior
recorded testimony may be qualified for admission under
the confrontation clause. Just as surrounding circum-
stances may give assurance of reliability to dying declara-
tions and to declarations against penal interest, so sur-
rounding circumstances may give assurance of reliability to
prior recorded testimony which was not subject at the time
to cross-examination. They also may provide the trier of fact
with firm bases for judging the credibility of the witness and
the truthfulness of his testimony.
Such circumstances are present in abundant measure here.
We have canvassed them in considering the admissibility of
the testimony under §804 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
574 F.2d at 1137.
Citing the same factual reasons on which it relied in finding
Brown's testimony admissible as a hearsay exception under
§804 (b) (5), the court held that the confrontation clause did not
bar the admission of that testimony which, based on the facts,
had "high degree of reliability and trustworthiness." 574 F.2d at
1138.
Writing that the majority "confused the issues of the admis-
sibility of hearsay and the right of a criminal defendant to be
confronted by his accusers," Judge Widener dissented, stating
that the "two different rules of law.. .are by no means identical,
but are closely akin." 574 F.2d at 1139, quoting Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74.
Judge Widener argued that the majority's confusion was in
treating the confrontation clause as a rule of evidence rather
than as it was intended, i.e. to regulate criminal trial procedure
by compelling the accuser's presence before the jury and the
defendant. Criticizing the conclusion of the majority that the
confrontation clause was not violated because the grand jury
testimony was reliable and corroborated and that, therefore,
"the jury could assess his veracity in his absence," Judge
FORUM
Widener referred to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 97: "... the whole question is not whether
the testimony is truthful; rather, the issue is whether there has
been such "adequate 'confrontation' "as to satisfy the require-
ments of the Constitution's Sixth Amendment. 574 F.2d at
1139.
In stating his belief that the admission of Brown's grand jury
testimony violated the right of the defendants to confront him,
forcing a reversal of the trial court convictions and remanding
the case for new trial, Judge Widener reiterated that "the
confrontation clause invokes a means of trial procedure which
provides a minimal, or threshold level of protection to the
defendant."
Citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), Judge Widener
stated: ". . .the essence of the confrontation clause is the
judgment that, the defendant is entitled, at the very least, to the
presence of the accuser before him and the jury." 574 F.2d at
1140.
As the dissent of Judge Widener concludes, this writer
believes that the issue of the inclusion at trial of grand jury testi-
mony of an unavailable witness, testimony controlled by the
prosecutor's leading questions and not subject to cross-
examination, is one that the Supreme Court must address. In
West, the majority may have extended the residual hearsay
exception under §804 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
a point that infringed on the basic procedural right of
confrontation of the defendants.
VIVA CEPEDA! Products
Liability and Employee
Protection
Products liability actions typically involve complaints against
parties who distribute products that cause physical injury to
persons or property. These suits are generally based upon
theories of negligence, breach ot warranty, and strict liability in
tort,' with the latter cause of action at the vanguard of recent
developments in "actionable products" litigation.
Two issues of particular concern to the products liability
attorney are the concepts of defect and contributory
negligence in a strict liability action.2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court recently addressed these points in Cepeda u.
Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816
(1978), a decision which offers a viable solution to the problems
of setting the standard for defining the defectiveness of a
product, but continues the controversy over the degree
and kind of contributory negligence on the part of the
injured plaintiff which will bar his recovery.
1. One commentator has stated that there are "at least nine distinct legal theories
on which a plaintiff may rely." Tort theories are: negligence, negligent misrepre
sentation threatening physical harm, strict liability for defective product, and
strict liability for innocent misrepresentation; Contract theories. breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, and breach of express warranty; Also, "two hybrid theories
that may involve a breach of some 'extra-U.C.C.' implied or express warranty."
Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis of its Vitality, 29 MERCER L. REV.
583, 584-585 (1978).
2. See, Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning ofDefect, 5 ST. MARYSL. J.
30 (1973).
The doctrine of strict liability in tort is expressed in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) as follows:
Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for
Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The Rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the pre-
paration and sale of its product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller.
It is immediately apparent that in a strict liability action one
neither needs to prove negligence on the part of the seller, nor
establish privity as a requirement to sue. The inquiry in the
strict liability suit is directed towards the product; such liability
is strict in that the seller's compliance with a negligence stan-
dard of care is irrelevant. Moreover, inasmuch as the require-
ment of privity is abolished, the intricacies of the law of
commercial transactions3 no longer must receive the at-
tention of the jury; again, the proper focus is shifted to
the product, and thus a workable definition of what
constitutes defectiveness under the Restatements formula
assumes great importance.
There are three modes of defectiveness precedent to finding
that a product is actionable:4 defects from design, a manufac-
turing error, and defects from a failure to affix to hazardous
products warnings and instructions necessary to ensure their
safe and proper use.5 Because strict liability does not mean
absolute liability, the plaintiff must prove that there was a de-
fect in the product at the time it left the defendant's con-
trol. See, Note, 17 FORDHAM L. REV, 943, 944 (1974). This
need for a standard of defectiveness is particularly important
because a juror may intuitively find a product to be defective
simply because the plaintiff was injured while using the pro-
duct-the juror would believe that the presence of injury
means that something was "wrong" with the product. This is
clearly absolute liability. As Dean Wade has stated: "Strict lia-
bility for products is clearly not that of an insurer. If it were, the
plaintiff would need only to prove that the product was a fac-
tual cause in producing his injury. Thus, the manufacturer of a
match would be liable for anything burned..." Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825,
828 (1973); see also, Note, supra, 17 FORDHAM L. REV. 943,
944-946.
3. For example, the seller may exclude warranties under U.C.C. §2 316
(although such disclaimer is unconscionable in personal injury cases). But see,
MD. COMMERCIAL LAW CODE §2-316.1. A statute of limitations may defeat even
a timely products liability complaint where it runs from the date of sale, and the
injury may not occur until after the sales transaction. Further, the plaintiff's action
may fail due to lack of privity, although some versions of U.C.C. §2 318 allow for
actions by third party beneficiaries not in privity to the sale.
4. Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturer's Liabilityfor Products, 10 INDIANA L.
REV. 755, 756 (1977). The term "actionable" is Wade's-it signifies a product's state
or characteristic which would support a cause of action.
5. A treatment of this third aspect is beyond the inquiry of this article.
